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This paper utilizes historical information to explore the relationship between labor 
force participation of middle aged and old people and the disability program in 
Japan. In particular, we explore the time series dimension to identify what has 
determined the trend in disability program participation over time and relate it with 
the labor supply. We find that mortality and health measures have been largely 
unrelated to the disability program participation rates. While major revisions to the 
disability program have  slightly expanded the eligibility  for  DI programs,  the 
program participation is still very low; thus, the effect on labor force participation is 
very limited in Japan, which is in contrast with some European countries that have 
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1. Introduction 
 
     In Japan and other developed countries,  disability pension programs 
commonly have a long history in public pension programs. The Japanese disability 
pension  program, which  started in 1944, has gradually expanded over several 
major revisions and has  contributed to improving  the  living standards  of the 
disabled. Indeed, the eligibility criteria have been generally eased, and the number 
of program recipients has shown a trend of modest increase. In contrast to some 
European countries  (Börsch-Supan,  2005),  however,  the disability pension 
program is rarely related with labor force participation (of the elderly) in Japan.   
     However, the fact that the disability pension program has so far been unlikely 
to be detrimental to labor force participation in Japan does not imply that the 
disability pension will not be relevant for retirement decisions in Japan. Indeed, the 
number of recipients of disability pension benefits has increased in recent years. It 
has been established that the aging population in Japan is growing at a remarkable 
speed, and the proportion of the elderly aged 65 and over in the total population 
had  reached 20 percent in 2005 and will reach 30 percent in 2025 and 
approximately  40 percent in 2050 (National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research, 2007). In the future, together with the historically lower fertility 
rate, population aging will cause a decline in the numbers of the labor force, and 
the situation might be exacerbated by expanding disability program participation. 
From this aspect, it is worthwhile to investigate the reason for the low take up rate 
in Japan, focusing on a distinction between institutional aspects (i.e., tight eligibility 
conditions) and non-institutional ones (i.e., better health conditions), which have not   2 
been sufficiently explored in Japan. 
     To this end, this paper utilizes historical information to explore the relationship 
between the disability pension program and labor force participation in Japan. In 
particular, we examine the time series data to identify what has determined the 
trend in disability program participation. Specifically, this paper performs two-fold 
analyses to separate institutional factors from non-institutional factors accounting 
for program participation. 
First, we provide historical information on mortality and health status 
measures in Japan. A  change in health status is sure to affect participation in 
disability insurance programs even without any revisions. Hence, understanding 
the trends in health status over time is critical to distill the effect of health conditions 
on the program participation. This task is not easy, however, because there is no 
“true” measure of health status. Thus, we must explore, over time, the relationships 
among representative measures of health, mortality rates, and subjective health 
status. 
Second, we attempt to understand the relationship between changes over 
time in the disability program and program participation. We identify three major 
revisions of the program in the post-war period and examine the relationship 
between these changes and the program participation rate so that we identify how 
trends in the disability program have been related with institutional revisions. 
Our discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a historical overview 
of the disability program in Japan, focusing on major revisions  that  are to be 
examined in later sections. Section 3 investigates historical representative data on 
health status, i.e., mortality,  subjective health status,  and other measures and   3 
relates them with each other in Japan. Section 4 describes the development of 
labor force participation,  examines the relationship with  program  revisions,  and 
quantifies the effect of the disability program revisions on “activity” measured by 
labor force participation rate. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Disability Program and other social security program reforms 
 
2. 1 Historical overview 
This section gives an overview  from a historical perspective of  the disability 
program and other related reforms to the social security program in Japan. At the 
outset, we need to clarify that what is often referred to as the “disability insurance 
(DI) program” in other countries corresponds to the “disability pension program” in 
Japan;  the program was constructed  in  the  public pension scheme,  and  all 
revisions to the disability program have been linked to those to the core pension 
programs. Among several programs to assist the disabled, the disability pension 
plays the most important role in terms of income compensation; therefore, we will 
focus on the description of the disability pension program  and  briefly  mention 
related programs at the end of this section. 
     The Japanese public pension program consists of three programs:  the 
Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI; Kosei Nenkin) whose pensioners are private 
employees;  the  National Pension Insurance (NPI; Kokumin Nenkin)  whose 
pensioners are self-employed  or  agriculture, forestry,  and fishery cooperative 
employees; and the Mutual Aid Insurance (Kyosai Nenkin) covering employees in 
the public sector and private schools. In terms of the number of pensioners, the EPI   4 
and the NPI contribute to the total by slightly less than half, respectively, and the 
MAI occupies the remaining small portion.
1
     When the EPI was launched in 1944 as the first social insurance style public 
pension program, it contained the disability pension program.
 We will describe below the revisions of 
the disability pension program over time, focusing on the EPI and NPI (Table 1). 
2  The initial program 
rated the disabled using two grades (Grade 1 and Grade 2) once qualified. The 
grading depended on functional ability to perform activities of daily living, rather 
than on loss of earning ability. Grade 1 referred to a condition in which a person 
was unable to perform activities of daily living (e.g., severe disability affecting both 
hands or complete blindness). Grade 2 referred to a condition in which a person 
faced  very severe limitations  in  performing  activities of daily living (any severe 
disability  affecting  either hand).  We need to pay attention to the fact that the 
program insured persons with mental disorders from the beginning, via the EPI. 
The revision of 1954 introduced Grade 3 to cover more disabled persons with less 
severe conditions than those in Grade 2.
3
       After establishment in the EPI, the disability pension program has expanded 
in some ways. To date, there have been four  major  revisions  during its 
development. We will consider them, focusing on who has been most affected in 
 
                                                   
1  See Oshio, Shimizutani, and Oishi (2010) for a detailed description of the Japanese public 
pension program and its historical development. 
2  A brief review of development of the disability pension program was provided by the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare (2009). The previous program of the EPI, which was called the 
“Workers Pension Insurance (Roudou Sha Nenkin Hoken Seido)” was launched in 1941 and 
covered only male and non-office workers. In 1944, the name of the program was changed to 
the EPI, and it began to cover office workers or females; this was very similar to the current 
system in terms of coverage. 
3  The EPI had only a single layer of a wage proportional benefit before 1954 in the old-age 
pension program and was reconstructed to a double tier structure (fixed rate part as the first tier 
and a wage proportional part as the second tier) in 1954. Even after 1954, however, the 
disability pension program had a single tier structure until the 1985 revision.   5 
each revision. The first revision was the introduction of the NPI effective in 1961. 
The NPI began to insure  those who were not covered by the EPI, i.e., 
self-employed workers and agricultural, forestry, and fishery sector workers. The 
introduction of the NPI was important, as it launched the universal pension system 
in the Japanese public pension program. The NPI drastically expanded the 
coverage of the disability pension program to more groups than just employees in 
the private sector. Unlike the EPI, the NPI had not covered mental disease at the 
time of its introduction. 
The NPI had two types of disability programs for recipients  with premium 
contribution and for those without. The first was the “Disability Pension Program 
(Shogai Nenkin),” which was designed for those who contributed the premium. The 
NPI was motivated by the spirit of social insurance and thus required the recipients 
to contribute the  insurance  premium to receive benefits.  The second was the 
“Disability Welfare Pension Program (Shogai Fukushi Nenkin),” which was 
designed for those who did not make premium contribution. Eligibility to receive 
disability pension benefit was judged at the time of the first doctor’s visit to survey 
the extent of the disease that made the person disabled. Thus, those who had 
received the first visit before reaching the age of 20 (the minimum age for NPI 
participation  is 20) or before 1961  were  not insured by the disability pension 
program under the NPI. They  were covered by the disability welfare pension 
program, which was financed by the government. The eligibility for this program 
was means-tested, and the amount of benefit was lower than that of the disability 
pension program.   6 
     The second revision took place in 1974. It called for expanding the coverage 
for mental disease. The NPI began to insure mental disorders in 1964 and mental 
deficiency in 1965.
4
     The third revision was implemented as a part of the major revision of core 
public pension programs in 1985 (effective from 1986). This revision was most 
drastic in recent years, as it harmonized all the public pension programs into an 
integrated form (see Oshio, Oishi, and Shimizutani, 2010). It reduced the benefit 
multiplier and flat-rate benefit in the old age pension program for the first time, 
aiming to restrain  an increase in total pension benefits. Three revisions were 
implemented with respect to the disability pension programs. 
  However, the coverage for mental disability was very limited. 
While those who paid the premium were eligible to receive the disability pension 
benefits once qualified as Grade 1 or 2 (note that there was no Grade 3 in the NPI), 
the disability welfare program insured the disabled only if rated as Grade 1. In 1974, 
the disability welfare program began to cover Grade 2 as well, and many patients 
with mental disorders or deficiencies became eligible to receive the benefit. 
First, a double tier structure was introduced. The NPI pensioners, both with 
and without premium contributions,  were  entitled to receive (1)  the flat rate 
“Disability Basic Pension (Shogai Kiso Nenkin)” benefit as the first tier, which was 
linked to the Basic Pension Benefit, and (2)  the wage proportional “Disability 
Employees’  Pension (Shogai Kosei Nenkin)”  program  as the second tier. The 
Disability  Welfare  Pension, which  was  funded by the government before the 
                                                   
4 In 1966, the NPI began to cover all diseases including liver and kidney diseases among other 
internal disorders.   7 
revision, was replaced by the Disability Basic Pension, which was funded by the 
government and premium contributions of the NPI pensioners. 
Second, the benefits for the disabled without premium contribution were 
raised to be at the same level as those for the disabled with premium contribution in 
the NPI. Both groups of the disabled were entitled to receive the same Disability 
Basic Pension benefit, and the amount doubled for the recipients of the disability 
welfare pension benefit. This is a remarkable revision for those who received the 
disability welfare pension, given that the 1985 revision reduced old age pension 
benefits in general. 
Third,  grading  of  disability conditions  was  harmonized  across programs. 
Before the revision, there was disparity in qualification criteria for the disabled even 
if the disability condition was the same.
 However, even after the harmonization of 
the grading, the Disability Basic Pension covered the disabled only in Grades 1 and 
2. The EPI program covers the disabled in Grade 3 too and provides “disability 
compensation” for a disabled pensioner with a disability less severe than Grade 3 if 
the disabled condition is fixed.
5
Lastly, the government allowed the Disability Basic Pension recipients aged 
65 years or above to additionally receive EPI benefits if they had made any EPI 
contributions in the past. This revision became effective as of 2006, most probably 
providing the elderly with incentives to apply for disability pension benefits. 
   
In sum, the disability pension programs in Japan have a long history starting 
in 1944. The disability pension program for private  firm employees (EPI 
                                                   
5  Since the EPI pensioners were required to join the NPI in the 1985 reform, the entitlement to 
receive disability pension became  contingent on the grading of the NPI (Disability  Basic 
Pension), even if a disabled person had been approved to receive disability pension benefits in 
the EPI or MAI program. The MAI program has a Grade 3 as well.   8 
pensioners) was introduced relatively early and was generous in that it covered 
mental diseases  as well as  patients who were less severely disabled.  The 
coverage of the disability pension has expanded. From 1961, NPI pensioners were 
entitled to receive the disability pension benefits, a move that  included the 
self-employed. From 1974, the disabled without premium contribution were entitled 
to receive the benefits if rated as Grade 2, thus including many persons who were 
mentally deficient  or had mental disorders. From 1986, the disabled without 
contribution were entitled to receive the disability basic pension benefit, which was 
same as for those with contribution. Finally, the Disability Pension Benefit recipients 
with any EPI contributions were entitled to additionally receive EPI benefits in 2006. 
Despite the domestic expansion, however, the size of the disability pension 
benefit is still relatively small in terms of economic size and public expenditure from 
an international perspective. According to OECD’s Social Expenditure Database, 
the share of the expenditure on disability pension benefits out of GDP was 0.3 
percent in Japan in 2005, much lower than that in Denmark, Sweden, and the UK, 
which register about 2 percent. Further, the share of the expenditure on disability 
pension benefits out of total public expenditure is about 2 percent, which is again 
much lower than that in other countries. 
 
2-2 Current scheme 
Under the current scheme, a person who visited a doctor for the first time for 
consultation about the cause of the disability when he/she was under the age of 20 
or when he/she was an NPI pensioner is entitled to receive the Disability Basic 
Pension  benefit.  Note that there is no limitation in terms of age  for  receiving   9 
disability pension benefits, unlike in some other countries where the recipients of 
disability pension benefits are converted to eligibility to receive old age pension 
benefits after attaining the eligible age (i.e., age 65). The formula to compute the 
benefit is as follows. 
 
Grade I = Basic Pension benefit × 1.25 + additional benefit for dependent children. 
Grade 2 = Basic Pension benefit + additional benefit for dependent children. 
 
The amount of the  Basic Pension benefit is 792,100 yen per year and that of 
additional child benefit is 227,000 yen each for the first and second children and 
75,900 yen each for the third and subsequent children. 
     In addition to the Disability Basic Pension, a person who consulted a doctor to 
identify the cause of the disability when he/she was an EPI pensioner is entitled to 
receive  wage-proportional Disability  Employees’  Pension  benefit  or  Disability 
Mutual Aid Pension benefit (for the MAI recipients). The formula to compute the 
benefit of the second tier is as follows. 
Grade 1 = Wage proportional benefit × 1.25 + Additional benefit for a spouse. 
Grade 2 = Wage proportional benefit + Additional benefit for a spouse. 
Grade 3 = Max [Wage proportional benefit, 594,000 yen]. 
 
The amount of additional benefit for a spouse is 227,900 yen per year.
6
                                                   
6 Momose (2008) used the purchasing power parity to compare the amount of benefits in 
Japan with that in the US and Sweden. While the amount of benefits of the disability employee 
pension (Grade 1 or 2) is larger than that in the US and Sweden, that of the disability basic 
pension (Grade 1) is much smaller and that for Grade 2 is a half of the standard benefit in US 
and Sweden. 
   10 
      Figure 1 reports the number of the recipients who received the disability 
pension benefits between 1970 and 2006.
7  The data source is the Annual Report 
of Social Security Administration (Shakai Hoken Jigyo Nenpo) published by the 
Social Security Agency. Unfortunately, there is no data available by gender or age. 
The number of recipients was about 0.5 million in 1970 and increased to 2.0 million 
in 2006; it expanded four times over 36 years. As seen from the figure, the 
dominant recipients are the NPI pensioners, who share about 80 percent of the 
total. Because most of them are self-employed, their labor supply is less likely to be 
associated with the generosity of the disability pension program and its institutional 
changes. In contrast, the EPI recipients have occupied less than 20 percent of the 
total. As discussed below, their labor supply is likely to be affected by institutional 
changes in eligibility of the disability pensions but their proportion is relatively small. 
Finally, the number of MAI pensioners to receive the disability pension, who are 
also likely to be affected by institutional factors, has been very small, 2–3 percent in 
all years.
8
The impact of past revisions to disability pension programs on DI participation 
are illustrated more clearly in Figure 2, which shows the growth rate of disability 
pension recipients. We observe three jumps: in 1974–75, 1985–86, and 2005–06. 
As described in Section 2-1, the 1974 revision added a Grade 2 level for the NPI 
   
                                                   
7  The fiscal year starts in April and ends in March in Japan. The figures are measured as of the 
end of the fiscal year. 
8  The number of MAI pensioners to receive the disability pension is not available; that of MAI 
pensioners eligible to receive the benefits is available in the Annual Report on Social Security 
Statistics (Shakai Hoken Tokei Nenpo) compiled by the National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research. We compute that the number of MAI pensioners to receive the 
disability pension, assuming the proportion of those to receive out of those eligible, both of 
which are available in the Annual Report of Social Security Administration, is the same for the 
EPI and the MAI programs.   11 
Disability Pension program. The 1985 revision raised the benefit for the NPI 
pensioners without premium contributions  (i.e., Disability Welfare Pension 
recipients) to the level for those with contribution. Finally, the 2006 revision allowed 
Disability Basic Pension recipients to receive the EPI benefit as well, if they had 
made EPI contributions. These jumps, albeit with limited impact on the total labor 
force, confirm that the DI participation is affected more directly by institutional 
changes than they are by changes in health status. 
 
2-3 Other programs for the disabled 
In addition to the disability pension, there are some other programs to assist the 
disabled.  One is employers’ compensation for employees who were injured, 
diseased, disabled, or killed during work-related activities, including a disaster while 
commuting. Even a firm employing one employee is required to join the insurance 
scheme  by law at the firm’s cost. The benefits include compensation for the 
treatment, labor in absence, and a disabled status after a treatment as well as 
benefits  for family members if the employee is killed. While the employers’ 
compensation covers the mentally disabled, the eligibility is very limited, and the 
number of those approved for the mentally disabled benefit, which is relevant to the 
rapid increase in the number of the recipients of the disability insurance in Europe, 
has been small.
9
                                                   
9  According to The Current Condition of Work Disaster Compensation for Mentally Disabled 
(Seishin Shougai nado no Rousai Hoshou Jyokyo) annually released by the Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare, the number of the approved was very small (9 between 1983 and 1996 
(14 years)) but increased to 100 in 2002 and around 270 in 2007 or 2008 
(
 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/roudoukijun/rousaihoken04/090316.html).   12 
     Another  program  is public assistance. While eligibility does not require a 
disabling condition to receive public assistance, the proportion of those who receive 
public assistance is larger for the recipients of the disability pension, suggesting 
that the disability pension benefits are not sufficient to compensate for the minimum 
living standards. This is particularly the case for those with mental disorders, and 
the share of the disabled to receive public assistance has increased for the 




3. Historical data on health 
 
     This section reviews some  long-term time series data on representative 
measures of health  status. First, the trend of mortality in Japan is examined. 
Second, another measure of health status, a subjective health status is used to 
describe the development of health status in Japan. Third, we will relate the two 
measures—mortality and subjective health status in Japan. 
 
3-1 Mortality 
Mortality trends are of course not identical with health status,  and thus with 
disability trends, but are probably the only historical measure available in Japan 
                                                   
10 Momose (2008) remarked that 250,000 persons received an additional allowance (Shougai 
Sha Kasan) for the disabled among the public assistant recipients in 2006 and the number has 
substantially increased, compared to 100,000 in the mid-1990s. According to a survey by the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (“Shougai Sha no Seikatsu Jittai”), the proportion of the 
recipients of public assistance is 6.4 percent (in 2003 and 7.0 percent in 2008) for the physically 
disabled, 3.4 percent (in 2003 and 2.7 percent in 2008) for the mentally retarded, and 25.7 
percent (in 2003 and 31.0 percent in 2008) for those with mental disorders, all of which are 
larger than the average proportion of the public assistance recipients. The high proportion of the 
mentally disabled is accounted for by the low employment rate, the high rate of remaining single, 
and the high rate of non-recipient of pension benefit.   13 
and that comparable with other countries. We present the mortality trends in three 
ways. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 illustrate the ages of equal mortality probability for 
males and females, respectively. The historical data on mortality by age and 
gender in every year from 1960 to 2007 is available in “Simplified Life Table (Kan-I 
Seimei Hyo).”
11
     Figure 4 presents the mortality trends in a different manner. It shows the 
two-year mortality rates by age and gender in 1960 and 2005. If we take the 5 
percent level of morality, the corresponding age for males in 1960 and 2005 was 
68.7 and 78.9, respectively, while that for females in 1960 and 2005 was 72.5 and 
84.0, respectively. The gap in the two years is larger for males probably because 
 We set the mortality at age 60 and 65 in 1960 as the reference 
points in the base year and computed the corresponding figures in the subsequent 
years, assuming the mortality increases linearly with the ages. As seen in Figure 
3-1, for males, the mortality at age 60 in 1960 corresponds to that at age 71.1 in 
2007 (11.1 years extension), and the mortality at age 65 in 1960 does so to that at 
age 75.6 in 2007 (10.6 years extension). Those results show that the mortality in 
Japan drastically declined over 50 years. Figure 3-2 reveals that the extension is 
more remarkable for females. The mortality at age 60 in 1960 corresponds to that 
at age 74.0 in 2007 (14.0 years extension), and the mortality at age 65 in 1960 
does so to that at age 78.1 in 2007 (13.1 years extension). On a closer look, it can 
be observed that the tempo of extension for males has accelerated in the 1970s 
and has become slightly stagnant in the 1990s. A similar pattern is observed for 
females too, but the weak trend in the 1990s is less evident. 
                                                   
11 Unfortunately, data is available only for every five year since 1995. We interpolated a linear 
trend for the 5 years to obtain the data in every year.   14 
the starting age in the initial year is lower than that for females. This figure also 
demonstrates that the mortality rate has substantially declined over 45 years. 
Figures 5-1 and 5-2 report the mortality rates at ages 55, 60, and 65 in every 
year for males and females, respectively. This again shows that the mortality rate 
has declined over half a century. The mortality has been monotonically declining 
and has always been lower for females than it has been for males. As observed in 
Figure 4, the decline in the male mortality rate is greater in the 1970s but slower in 
the 1990s, while that for the female mortality rate is linear. 
 
3-2 Self-rated health 
Next, we move on to discussing other health measures. A representative measure 
of health status is a self-rated health status, which has been widely used to stand 
for the state of progress of the condition. While there are some critiques for the 
measure because of its subjective nature, it is accepted as a popular aggregate 
health measure that  is easily obtained at a low cost. A standard version of 
self-reported health status is the North American version with five answer 
categories ranging from “excellent” to “poor.” Another is the European version with 
five answer categories ranging from “very good” to “very poor.” The North American 
version is more popular and employed in some large data sets in Japan, including 
the Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions of People (CPSLCP) compiled by 
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare starting in 1986 and JSTAR (Japanese 
Study of Ageing and Retirement), which is internationally comparable to 
HRS/ELSA/SHARE (Ichimura, Hashimoto, and Shimizutani, 2009), starting in 2007. 
We utilize the data of self-rated health on a five-point scale from the   15 
CPSLCP—“excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair,” and “poor.” 
     Figures 6-1 and 6-2 illustrate the developments of the self-rated health status 
in males and females, respectively—the shares of those assessing their heath 
conditions “excellent” or “very good and those assessing them as “very good” or 
“good”—as well as the shares of respondents reporting subjective symptoms and 
of those who visit  a hospital/clinic among  those  aged 55–64  (per thousand 
persons), along with the mortality rate for the same age group over the period 
between 1986 and 2007. The CPSLCP began in 1986 and is performed every 
three years. While the morality rate has been steadily declining, the share of those 
reporting good health increased up to the middle of the 1990s, although it has 
displayed a declining trend to date. With no clear trend observed from the other two 
health measures, it suggests that there is a negligible relationship between the 
health measure and the decline in mortality. 
 
3-3 LFP and DI versus mortality 
This section examines the relationship between LFP and DI in  comparison  to 
mortality. To this end, we first collected data of the number of DI recipients by age 
group and gender from the Review of Public Pension Finances (Zaisei Saikeisan), 
which the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare releases almost every five years. 
Next, we linearly interpolated the figures for other years with some adjustment.
12
                                                   
12 In the Review of Public Pension Finances, the number of recipients by age and gender for 
EPI pensions is available in 1979, 1983, and 1986 and that of the eligible is in 1991, 1996, 2001 
and 2007. We use the shares of the recipients (or the eligible) by gender and age group 
(multiplied by the total number available in the Annual Report on Social Security Administration) 
to estimate the number of the recipients in those years. We assume that the shares for MAI 
pensioners are identical with those of EPI pensioners. The number of recipients of NPI 
pensioners under the old program before 1985 is available in 1978, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 
   16 
Figures 7-1 and 7-2 show the trends of employment and disability along with the 
mortality rate for those aged 60–64 for males and females, respectively. While the 
mortality rate has been declining steadily, the trend of the employment rate has 
been slightly downward for males and almost flat for females, with some cyclical 
movements for both. More importantly, the share of DI recipients has remained 
very low for both males and females, albeit with a slight upward trend, and had no 
clear co-movements with the employment rate and the mortality rate. 
Figures 8-1 and 8-2 show the relationships between the employment rate 
and age and between the employment rate and mortality risk for males, where 
mortality risk is one-year mortality rate at a given age. The employment rate by age 
declined slightly  from 1980 to 2005 but that by mortality risk declined more 
substantially. More specifically, the employment rate was 50  percent  at  an 
approximate age of 70 in 1980 and at an approximate age of 66 in 2005, while it 
was 50 percent at the mortality rate of about 3.5 percent in 1980 and only about 1.4 
percent in 2005. Although the mortality rate declined substantially over the past 25 
years, the elderly have become more inclined to retire. See Figures 9-1 and 9-2 for 
females. The employment rate by age shifted upward up to age 60 and remained 
almost unchanged beyond that between 1980 and 2005.  The 
mortality-employment curves skewed to the vertical axis, and the level of the 
mortality rate that corresponds to a 50 percent employment rate stayed 
approximately 0.5 percent over the same period. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
2001, and 2007 and those under the new program after 1985 in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 and 
2007 (the number of the eligible instead of the number of recipients since 1991 for both). We 
applied the same method to compute the number of recipients in those years. After those 
computations, we performed linear interpolation.   17 
4. Historical data on activity and program participation rates 
 
     This section explores the historical relationship between labor force 
participation and disability pension programs.
13
 
  The goal is to assess the effect of 
each revision in the disability pension program on the labor market by discovering 
trends that may be explained by the revisions. 
4.1 Historical labor force data 
Figures 10–12 examine the long-term trends in the labor force, focusing on the 
rates of employment, unemployment, and not being in the labor force for three age 
groups: 40–44, 50–54, and 60–64 over 1970–2010 for males and females. For 
males, the employment rate shows cyclical movements with a slightly downward 
trend for those aged 60–64, while it has remained stable at a high level for the 
younger two age groups. Correspondingly, the oldest age group shows clearer 
cyclicality of the rates of those unemployed and of those not in the labor force as 
compared to the other age groups. For females, the rates of those employed and of 
those not in the labor force show a modest uptrend and downtrend, respectively, for 
the two younger age groups, while they are stable for those aged 60–64. The 
unemployment rate has been moving almost the same way across age groups. 
 
4.2 Historical DI data 
Figures 13-1 and 13-2 present long-term trends of the shares of DI beneficiaries in 
total population for three age groups: 40–45, 50–54, and 60–64 for males and 
                                                   
13 It would be excellent if direct data were available on pathways to retirement but unfortunately, 
no such data is available in Japan.   18 
females, respectively, between 1970 and 2010. The figures also indicate the three 
major revisions in 1974, 1986, and 2006. We observe that the share of DI recipients 
has been modestly increasing for all the age groups in both males and females, 
though the share remains low. For males, the share is 1–2 percent for those aged 
40–45, whereas that for those aged 50–54 and 60–64 increased from 1–2 percent 
in 1970 to 3-4 percent in 2010. 
Taking a closer look, we see that there are small jumps in 1974–75, 1985–86, 
and 2005–06—albeit not for all age groups—consistent with Figure 2. All of them 
are caused by the revisions to disability pension programs. In particular, for both 
males and females aged 60–64, we observe a remarkable increase in the DI 
beneficiaries  following the 1975 revision and the jump in 2006. In 1974, the 
disability welfare program began to cover Grade 2 as well, and many patients with 
mental disorders or deficiencies became eligible to receive the benefit. The 2006 
revision allowed  Disability  Basic Pension recipients  aged 65 or above  to 
additionally receive EPI benefits, providing the elderly with more incentives to apply 
for Disability Basic Pension. However, these trends in the DI participation rates are 
unrelated to those in the unemployment rates in all age groups (see Figures 11-1 
and 11-2), suggesting that there is no trade-off between DI and unemployment 
benefit receipts. 
 
4.3 Historical data on DI participation versus mortality and health 
Next, we try to relate the DI participation and health measures. Figures 14 and 15 
present long-term trends in mortality at age 45 and 60 and DI participation rates at 
ages  40–44 and 60–64  for males  and females. It is clear that there is no 
reasonable relation between the two series in each figure. Instead, we observe a   19 
contradicting pattern:  the DI participation rate has increased despite the lower 
mortality implying that people have become healthier. Figures 14–15 show that 
there are two small bumps in the DI participation rate after the 1974, 1985, and 
2006 revisions, which are evident for males aged 50–54 and 60–64. In contrast, 
there is no jump in the mortality rate in the same period, reinforcing the idea that the 
small increases in the DI participation rate were  motivated by the DI program 
revisions. This justifies the observations that there is no discontinuity in the DI 
participation rate after some disturbances in the mortality rates in the second half of 
the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, which is the case for both males and 
females. 
     Figures 16–18 illustrate long-term trends of self-rated health status at age 
55–64 and DI participation rates at age 60–64 for males and females, respectively. 
Figure 16 shows that there is little correspondence between DI participation and the 
shares of those who reported their health was “excellent” or “very good” and those 
who reported it as “fair” or “good.” The share of the latter group increased until the 
mid 1990s but declined from the end of the 1990s, while the share of the former 
remained virtually the same. However, the DI participation rate showed an uptrend. 
This is the case for both males and females. 
Figure 17 also shows little association between DI participation and the share 
of those who reported bad health (“poor” or “very poor”), which is again the case for 
both males and females. The share of people suffering from bad health declined 
until the mid 1990s but increased slightly from the end of the 1990s, while the DI 
participation rates continued to increase. 
Figure 18 computed a score of self-rated health status, which assigns “five” to 
the best of the five choices and “one”  to the worst. Again, there is no clear   20 
relationship between DI participation and the score of self-perceived health status. 
These figures show that the trend of DI participation is unrelated with self-rated 
health status, the same as  for the relationship between DI participation and 
mortality,  although we need to be careful in  interpreting  the comparison of 
self-rated health status across individuals and time. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
     This paper investigates historical information to explore the relationship 
between labor force participation of middle aged and old people and the disability 
program in Japan. In particular, we explore the time series dimension to identify 
what has determined the trend in disability program participation over time and 
relate it with the labor supply. 
     We find that the mortality  and  other health measures have  been largely 
unrelated with the disability program participation rates. While major revisions of the 
disability program have  slightly expanded the eligibility for the DI program, the 
program participation is still very low; thus, the effect on labor force participation is 
very limited in Japan, in contrast to some European countries with a high take up 
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Figure 3-2. Ages of equal mortality probability for women












Figure 4. Two-year mortality rates by age and gender, 
1960 and 2005
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Figure 5-2. Female mortality
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Figure 8-2. Male employment rate by mortality risk 
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Figure 9-2. Female employment rate by mortality risk 
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Figure 13-2. Female NLF disability
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Figure 15-1. Male mortality vs. disability age 60
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Figure 16-2. Female good health vs. disability age 60
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Figure 17-2. Female bad health vs. disability age 60






























































Figure 18-2. Female self-rated health vs. disability age 60
 